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THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
THE PRIVATE CORPORATE ENTITY ON
THE INTERNATIONAL PLANE
Henry M. Gallagher, Jr.::"
Protection of a client's assets in a foreign country has al-
ways been one of a lawyer's most uncertain problems. Today,
with international trade depending increasingly upon foreign cor-
porate entities, the protection of foreign assets is even more diffi-
cult than before. And the difficulty is the price which must be
paid for benefits derived from organizing some form of legal per-
son under foreign laws for the purpose of conducting foreign
business.' Preservation of the value of assets held by such organi-
zations often depends upon whether a tribunal will look through
the formal corporate organization to the ultimate owner and con-
sider his interest.
Foreign corporate entities have various generic names, but
all possess important common characteristics. They are artificial
persons which can sue and be sued in their own names in the
country of their organization.2 Although governments may con-
tribute capital to them, they are usually private commercial or-
ganizations.3 At least some of their shareholders have limited
liability.4 Corporate entities not infrequently are parts of a
larger worldwide enterprise. 5
This article is restricted to tracing some of the influences
Member of the Nebraska Bar.
1 Of course the principal benefit is economic. For an example Stand-
ard Oil (N.J.), to cut costs, maintains the bulk of its fleet under Pana-
manian registry through a subsidiary in Panama. See Hearings before
the Permanent Subcommittee on investigations of the Committee on Gov-
ernment Operation pursuant to S.R. 251, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
2Ballantine, Corporations § 118 (1946); cf. Anderson v. Abbott, 321
U.S. 349 (1944); United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Co., 142 Fed.
247, 255 (E.D. Wis. 1905).
3 Cf. Kunglig Jamvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter and Carpenter, 30 Fed. 891
(S.D.N.Y. 1924); see 2 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 477-479
(1941).
4 In some countries a limited partnership falls under this category.
"The partnership ... is a civil person .... Hence, therefore, the part-
ners are not the owners of the partnership property. [This principle is]
well recognized in all countries.. . where the civil [as opposed to common]
law is in force." Majority opinion of the United States-Chilean Claims
Commission, Chauncey v. Chile ("Alsop Claim"), Perry's Rep. 20,21
(1901); cf. Smith v. McMicken, 3 La. Ann. 322 (1848).
6 Superficially such organizations resemble the familiar holding company.
See Kronstein, The Nationality of International Enterprises, 52 Col. L.
Rev. 983, 985 (1952).
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behind foreign corporate difficulties and examining some of the
representative cases.
I.
In an ordinary law suit there are usually two jurisdictional
problems: (1) Is the corporation authorized locally to have
standing before the court? (2) Was the corporation "doing busi-
ness" in the jurisdiction when the cause of action arose?6 In an
international adjudication neither formalities of authorization
nor presence in a jurisdiction indicates the crucial problem. The
problem of jurisdiction in international law is illustrated by the
following hypothetical case:
The parent corporation, incorporated in country A, owns a sub-
stantial amount of the stock of a subsidiary, incorporated in
country B. Country B confiscates the property of the subsidiary.
As a result the parent wishes to sue country B in an international
tribunal. Country B argues that the corporate entity is a crea-
tion of country B, is a national of country B, and therefore has
no standing to sue country B in an international tribunal.
The problem is whether an international tribunal will pierce
the corporate veil and hold that the subsidiary is actually owned
by nationals of country A-thus conferring jurisdiction on an
international tribunal.
Recently the problem was presented to a tribunal in the
Westhold Corporation case.7 In deciding this case a panel of
American commissioners, without mentioning any theory of cor-
porate personality, looked through a Delaware corporation, with
a large American interest, straight to the international enter-
prise.8 The Westhold claim was against Yugoslavia for the value
of property nationalized there after World War II. United States
companies could bring such a claim if, in addition to being incor-
porated here, they had at least a twenty percent American owner-
ship of their securities. 9 But the commission went further than
this statutory stipulation, requiring a twenty percent beneficial
13 Compare International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945).
7 U.S. International Claims Comm., Doe. No. 4-1235, Proposed Dec. No.
54 (hearing not requested), 47 Am. J. Int'l L. 623 (1953).
s The Commission was established by the International Claims Settle-
ment Act of 1949, 64 Stat. 12 (1950), 22 U.S.C. § 1622 et seq. (1952).
Though an American commission is not technically on the international
plane, the treaty giving it jurisdiction and the nature of its problems re-
quired reliance on international standards. See note 17 infra.
962 Stat. 2658, 2659 (1948), 22 U.S.C. § 1627 (1952).
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interest in Americans, and refused jurisdiction because it found
that the whole beneficial interest was a foreign interest.'0
Disputes over whether the corporate veil will be pierced
arise, though their basis may be a private controversy, because a
national government has chosen to recognize one private party
exclusively. 1 On the international plane the test arises when the
governmental policy is made an issue.1
2
Government policy toward the corporate entity, ultimately
decisive of its position in any international arbitration, often de-
pends upon economic and social relationships which affect the
stability of the national State. Economic and social factors which
influence such policy have occasionally been the mainsprings of
national court opinions.' :' Government policy convolutions to meet
economic and social requirements in recognizing corporate mem-
bers of an international enterprise must be resolved within a
framework of standards followed by most nations in their foreign
dealings.t'
Social and economic relationships of the corporate entity to
the national State may vary markedly from the picture presented
by the legal record of the corporate entity with the State.15 Vari-
ations between the fact and the record can result in serious in-
10 The tribunal cited the Senate committee report which advanced the view
that "a substantial American beneficial interest should exist in an Ameri-
can juridical entity prior to the espousal of the entity's claim." Sen. Rep.
No. 800, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 10. (1949). Cf. United States v. The
Meacham, 107 F. Supp. 997 (E.D. Va. 1952), aff'd, 207 F.2d 535 (4th
Cir. 1953).
11 This is often because of a preference for corporations organized under
the State's own general corporation laws.
12 Countries must espouse private claims and back them as a policy
matter, thus becoming the nominal litigants before an international tri-
bunal. See Affair of the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, P.C.I.J.,
Ser. A/B, No. 9 at 10, 12 (1924); Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case, I.C.J.
Rep. 93, 112 (1952).
13 See United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945). For a holding that an "ownerless" corporate entity was
independent for the purpose of maintaining orderly economic processes, see
Moscow Fire Insurance Co. v. Bank of New York, 280 N.Y. 286, 310, 318.
20 N.E.2d 758 (1939). Though much of this case was overruled by United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), the reasonableness of this particular
holding went unquestioned. Id. at 227, 228.
14 To the extent that harmony is an objective of national policy, which
is a limitation of all legal theory. "International standards" are accepted
practices among governments; the sanctions for their violation range
from protests through retaliation by other governments and continual vio-
lators usually find themselves faced with war against a coalition of powers.
15 For a similar analysis of domestic corporate problems see Berle,
Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 Col. L. Rev. 343 (1947).
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ternational differences as to the status of the corporate entity
and as to who owns its property.
Challengers of a corporate entity's status before an interna-
tional tribunal are generally trying to prove or disprove its "na-
tionality," a usual requirement of jurisdiction as is illustrated by
the Westhold case.1 , Enterprises with international managements
often find themselves opposing the policies of national States,
whereas in fact a "national" is generally expected to support the
policy of his government.17 The State may raise an objection of
"nationality," and in meeting this argument both national and
international tribunals have found themselves breaking traditional
theories of corporate personality.' s In piercing the corporate
veil these tribunals not infrequently imply that neither the tradi-
tional "fiction" nor "existence" theories, with their standard ex-
ceptions, fits the case at hand. 9 Conversely, where the theories
can be used to justify an otherwise appropriate result, they are
followed as a reason for refusing to look behind corporate papers.
The futility of traditional doctrine in certain cases was rec-
ognized implicity by international tribunals at a relatively early
16 The organic agreement establishing an international tribunal ("com-
promis" or "statute") determines both the jurisdiction and the area with-
In accepted standards where the parties agree the tribunal shall operate.
See Ralston, The Law and Procedure of International Tribunals 5 (1926);
Oppenheim, International Law (8th ed., Lauterpacht, 1949).
17 Opposition may be social as well as economic. Withdrawal of tech-
nical or financial support from a local corporate entity by an international
enterprise may affect national economic balance. Also the entity's customs
and practices involve individuals in schemes of morality and pressures
whose origins may lie deep in an alien culture. See Ehrlich, Fundamental
Principles of the Sociology of Law 62 (Moll. transl. 1936); Commons, In-
stitutional Economics 700-710 (1934). Generally, see Meyer & Torczyner,
Corporations in Exile, 43 Col. L. Rev. 364 (1943); Berge, Cartels: Chal-
lenge to a Free World (1944); Edwards, Economic and Political Aspects of
International Cartels (1944); Hamilton, Cartels, Patents and Politics, 23
Foreign Affairs 582 (1945).
Is Corporate "nationality" is even more tenuous than that of natural
persons. An English judge remarked that a corporation "can be neither
loyal nor disloyal. It can be neither friend nor enemy." Lord Parker,
quoting Buckley, L.J., in Continental Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Daimler, [1916]
2 A.C. 307, 344.
10On the theories see Maitland, Introduction to and Translation of
Gierke's Political Theory of the Middle Ages (1900), and 3 Collected
Papers 310 (1911); Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal
Personality, 35 Yale L.J. 655 (1926). The standard exceptions are dis-
cussed by Judge Sanborn in United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Co.,
142 Fed. 247 (E.D. Wis. 1905). Cf. the discussion of abstractions gener-
ally in Cohen, A Preface to Logic 89, 94-98 (1944).
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date. This enabled them to avoid some of the pitfalls into which
national courts have fallen. 20  Some theories were developed ad
hoc, such as that which justified piercing the corporate veil where
"control" is in unfriendly alien hands.21 This theory, useful in
penalizing unwanted outside influence, has its drawbacks in the
difficulty of finding who "controls" a given corporate act and in
providing only uncertain protection to local industry from sum-
mary liquidation. 22
The cases summarized below present much dicta which com-
mon law lawyers will recognize at once as attempts to apply ad
hoc theories to particular facts where older "rules" would not fit.
The bold use of such reasoning to reconcile theory to fact, though
as yet of limited success, has already created a new climate of
legal thought, as the Westhold decision shows.2 3 Further develop-
ment should insure the security of property which is so necessary
to the establishment and growth of flourishing international
trade.
II.
Early cases had few theoretical difficulties. For example,
in rejecting a claim against France an early British international
claims tribunal remarked that although all the capital was sup-
plied by Britishers, "the institutions on behalf of which claims
20 For instance, anti-trust laws have been only imperfectly successful
in regulating international enterprise for the sake of national business
morality. See, e.g., United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd.,
105 F. Supp. 215, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), and British Nylon Spinners V.
Imperial Chemical Industries. [1953] 1 Ch. 19. Also note Justice Frank-
furter's Concurrence in United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 235-236
(1941).
21 For a general analysis from this point of view see Domke, The Con-
trol of Corporations, 3 Int'l. L.Q. 52 (1950). Some reasoning used in
early opinions of international tribunals was almost wholly lacking any
theoretical basis. See note 37 infra.
22 Who controls? A mere three percent of ownership has had "control"
in some cases. See Hearing before Senate Committee on Interstate Com-
merce on S. 1725, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 469 (1935); F.T.C. Report on
Utility Corporations, Sen. Doc. No. 92, part 72-A, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
135-151 (1935). Management sometimes has control, but what skill
groups in management are important to the decision? See Berle and
Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 238 (1932). Credi-
tors may control by coercion or statutory protection. Labor, consumers
and other groups may be controlling elements. See Galbraith, The Concept
of Countervailing Power (1952). On the need for local economic stability
see note 13 supra.
23 Supra note 7.
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are made... were in the nature of French corporations."''  The
corporate claimants were creatures of French law, said the tri-
bunal, and "their end and object were not authorized by, but were
directly opposed to, British law...-21
But changing conditions toward the end of the nineteenth
century demanded new results. In one case Cerruti, an Italian,
formed a Colombian corporate entity, and company property was
seized when he fell out of political favor. Italy espoused Cerruti's
claim against Colombia and demanded the value of the property;
the dispute was finally submitted to President Grover Cleveland.
In his award President Cleveland followed the example of Colom-
bia in her confiscation, penetrating the corporate veil to give the
claimant the value of his property. 26 After a vigorous protest of
this refusal to recognize the corporate entity exclusively Colombia
finally executed the award.27
Several interesting cases came up in the Venezuelan arbitra-
tions under protocols of 1903. A New York Company, for in-
stance, owned two thirds of the stock of a Venezuelan corpora-
tion organized to collect tolls. Venezuela unilaterally cancelled
this right, and Kunhardt & Co., the New York company, pre-
sented a claim for the value of its stock. Over Venezuelan ob-
jections the Commission looked behind the corporate entity and
gave Kunhardt the standing of claimant, but made no award be-
cause it said that loss was not proved. 2
For the most part Venezuelan commissions found themselves
hamstrung by traditional theory, however. Thus, in refusing to
look through corporate papers where a German interest sought
damages for injury to its Venezuelan affiliate, the German-Vene-
zuelan Commission stated that "this Commission can not take
jurisdiction of a claim which is not owned by a German subject.' '29
The Germans had "only a right to an accounting for their con-
24 Daniel v. Commissioners for Claims on France, reported in Knapp, 2
P.C. Rep. 48 (1833). This commission functioned under an Anglo-
French treaty of 1818 similarly to the Westhold tribunal. Supra note 8.
25 See also Long v. Commissioners for Claims on France, Knapp, 2 P.C.
Rep. 51 (1833).
26 President Cleveland may have thought the company analagous to a
United States limited partnership. See dissent of the American Commis-
sioner in Chauncey v. Chile, Perry's Rep. 20, 21 (1901).
2711 Moore, International Arbitrations 2120, 2122 (1898); 6 A.J. Int'l
L. 1018-1029 (1912).
2 Ralston, Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903 66-67 (1904).
29 Brewer, Moller & Co. case, id. at 597.
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tribution" of capital and were "not the legal owners of the debt
or of any interest therein." 30
Before the Spanish Treaty Claims Commission established
under the United States-Spanish peace treaty of 1899,31 a number
of corporate entities argued that they must be recognized as ex-
elusive owners of claims against Spain. Typical of these diffi-
cult cases is that of the Constancia Sugar Company claim.32  A
Spanish noble and his brother owned and controlled the stock of
this corporation, except for a small block held by directors to
satisfy New York law. "A deed was made [of the property at
issue] ... by the Apezteguia brothers [the Spanish stockholders]
to the Constancia Sugar Company during the war, before the
damages complained of were committed, but was never recorded
under the laws of Spain until after the war was over. The Apez-
teguia brothers apparently continued in possession of the proper-
ty, and managed it exactly as they had before the deed was made
.... The holding of the commission sustained the claimant [cor-
poration] ... holding the same as it had in all corporation cases. ' 33
The United States Assistant Attorney General complained
that these cases made the corporate entity "so impenetrable that
an international tribunal may not look through it to determine
whether persons excluded from participating in awards by ex-
press terms of the convention or treaty, may nevertheless parti-
cipate in an award made to a corporation in which they may
hold stock" and that this result "has seemed utterly at variance
with a treaty and enabling statute which provide for indemnity
to American citizens only."34
A famous early twentieth century claim was advanced against
Chile by the United States on behalf of a Chilean corporate en-
tity, Alsop & Co. 35  Although United States citizens owned the
30 Ibid. See also Baasch & Romer case under the Netherlands-Vene-
zuelan protocol of 1903, id. at 906-910; Compagnie Generale des Eaux de
Caracas case, id. at 271.
31II Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and
Agreements Between the United States and Other Powers, 1776-1909, 1692
(1910).
32 Spanish Treaty Claims Commission, Table of Cases 163 (1910). This
body was similar to the Westhold commission, see note 8 supra.
33 Spanish Treaty claims commission, Tables of cases 163, 164 (1910).
Compare the Narcisa Sugar Company case, id. at 166.
34 Brown, Final Report on Spanish Claims 16, 18. Compare discussion
of the Westhold case and note 10 supra. Cf. Fritz Schulz v. Raimes &
Co., 100 Misc. 697, 166 N.Y. Supp. 567 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
35Alsop Claim, Case No. 3, United States-Chilean Claims Commission,
Perry's Report (1901).
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whole capital of this company, the United States-Chilean Claims
Commission refused jurisdiction on the ground that the corporate
entity was a Chilean national, whose claim could not be advanced
by the United States.36 Dissatisfaction with this result on both
sides led to its submission to the King of England who, in his
opinion, recognized the international enterprise sufficiently to
award compensation to the claimant.37
Increasing attention was paid to international enterprises
after World War 1.3s War claims were adjudicated in a number
of mixed tribunals which advanced highly diverse doctrines. 39 The
crux of most corporate claims cases seems to have been the effect
on corporate entities of either enemy ownership or of assumption
of management by an enemy government during the war.
When, for instance, the German subsidiary of an English
company objected to paying its parent for goods sold and de-
livered before the war, the Anglo-German mixed tribunal found
against it, observing that the German government had taken over
its management during the war.40  A bow was made to tradition
also: "Creditor and debtor," said the tribunal, are not "judici-
ally the same person."4' 1 Similarly the Anglo-Bulgarian tribunal
allowed recovery in a case against a Bulgarian corporate de-
fendant, refusing to abandon jurisdiction although most of the
defendant's shares and management were in non-Bulgarian
36 Id., Decision No. 4 (1901).
37 The basis of this opinion seems to have been that to decide other-
wise "would practically exclude the possibility of any real decision on the
equities of the claim put forward." Award of H.M., Ring George V, 5,
9. Compare the United States attitude in the Mexican oil cases, 'Docu-
ments on the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913, 1003. See
also Jones, Claims on Behalf of Nationals who are Shareholders in Foreign
Companies, 26 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 225, 237-242 (1949).
3S For instance, United States diplomatic assistance was given to an
American-owned British company in Africa. II Foreign Relations of the
United States 245-251 (1920).
39 The decisions of these tribunals are collected in 1 to 9 Recueil des
Decisions des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes institutes par les traites de paix
(1922-1930).
40 Chamberlain & Hookam, Ltd. v. Solar Zahlerwerke G.m.b.h., id at
722 (1922).
41 Id. If the Germans had not used the property for war purposes, a
different result might have been reached. Cf. a somewhat similar situa-
tion in United States courts, Taylor v. Standard Gas Company, 206 U.S.
307 (1939). Compare also Societe Anonyme des Salines du Haras c.
Deutsche Bank, supra note 39, vol. 4 at 861.
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hands.42
Tribunals litigating French interests evolved the theory of
"control.143 A French interest recoverd against a Turkish com-
pany in an early case because of the defendant's German charac-
ter.44  Germans held 41.5% of the defendant's stock and 10%v
was owned by a German-controlled Turkish company; 12 out of
27 directors were Germans and a German presided at board meet-
ings, which were held at Berlin; finally, the company was operated
as part of a "German group" represented by the Deutsche Bank.
"It is quite conformable to the spirit of the [Versailles] Treaty
to take a greater account of the real economic circumstances than
of the merely outward circumstances," stated the tribunal.45
Typical of cases where "control" reasoning was used to re-
fuse recovery are two cases in which the companies were found
to be nationals of other Allied countries, rather than French or
enemy. In one case a German defendant was held to be English
because its parent, an English company, held 980 out of its 1000
shares.46 In the other case a French claimant was held to
be Belgian because it was actually a branch office of a Belgian
company, nominally incorporated but with no substantial position
in the French economy. 7 And, in a case where Ottoman State
Bank claimed French nationality, it was held not a French cor-
42 James Dawson & Son v. Balkanische Handels u. Industrie A.G., supra
note 39, vol. 3 at 534. The court distinguished Continental Tyre & Rub-
ber Co. v. Daimler. [1891] 2 A.C. 307, as applying to "laws regarding
trading with its enemy" only. Cf. McNair in 4 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 44, 53
(1923); The Unitas [1950] 2 All E.R. 219 (P.C.).
43See note 21 supra.
44 Societe du Chemin de fer de Damas-Hamah c. la Compagnie du chemin
de fer de Bagdad, supra note 39, vol. 1 at 401.
45 Id. at 402. (Author's translation). Cf. a case where a Franco-Bul-
garian tribunal held for two Turkish companies owned by French share-
holders. Regie Generale de Chemins de fer, etc. c. Etat bulgare, supra
note 39, vol. 3 at 594.
46 Elmores Metall A.G. c. Grunberg, supra note 39, vol. 5 at 777.
47 Societe Anonyme "La Providence" a Rehon c. Roheisverbande, Gesells-
chaft, etc., supra note 39, vol. 5 at 780. Cf. Societe Anonyme du char-
bonnage Frederic Henri c. Etat Allemande, supra note 39, vol. 1 at 422,
427-428, which follows the French view. In French national courts the
veil has been pierced where only a local branch office was incorporated.
Lanco v. Singer Co. [Rennes 1930] 58 Clunet 1099 (1931); Societe Rem-
ington Typewriter [Cass. Req. 1931] Dalloz I, 121 (1936); Societe Uni-
versal Film v. Societe Dupont [Lille 1941] II, 21 (Sirey 1941). Courts re-
fused, generally, to pierce the veil where a substantial domestic establish-
ment was maintained. See. e.g., French State v. J. Graf & Co. [Cass.
1930] 58 Clunet 654 (1931). For another view see Domke, Problems of
International Law in French Jurisprudence, 36 A.J. Int'l L. 24, 33 (1942).
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poration although there was a substantial French interest in the
corporation. The tribunal argued that along with nationality of
shareholders "all the administrative, financial and other elements
which are liable to ensure control of a company to nationals of a
certain power" must be considered.4 8
But "control" has not been the decisive criterion in other
cases. "Control" was unsuccessfully argued before a German-Bel-
gian tribunal which refused to allow recovery against a Turkish
corporate entity with German stock ownership. 49 And the Hun-
garian-Roumanian tribunal awarded a German-owned Hungarian
company specific performance of a mining concession contract
cancelled by Roumania.50 Also recovery was denied by the
Austro-Yugoslav tribunal to an Austrian-owned German company
whose sugar refinery in Belgrade had been confiscated. 51
Claims arising after World War I posed decreasing theore-
tical difficulty since national governments increasingly realized
that domestic owners of foreign corporations deserved protection. -52
However, there were other problems which caused difficulty
-principally arguments for a special standard of proof of cor-
porate personality 53 and "control" arguments aimed at reading
45 De Neuflize c. Etat Allemand et Deutsche Bank, supra note 39, vol.
$ at 158. Cf. some decisions in the Egyptian mixed tribunals, e.g. The
Commercial and Agency Company of Egypt v. The Manufacturers Life In-
surance Co., Commercial Tribunal of Alexandria, 23 Gazette des Tribu-
naux Mixtes d'Egypte 306 (1932-33).
49 Societe des Transports Fluveaux en Orient c. Societe Imperiale Otto-
mane du chemin de fer de Bagdad, supra note 39, vol. 9 at 664. Recovery
would have been doubtful anyway, since the "Belgian" claimant was really
part of an Anglo-German enterprise.
50 Ungarische Erdgas A.G. c. Etat roumain, supra note 39, vol. 9 at
448. The tribunal noted that (Author's translation) "during the whole
time the companies in question pursued their activities, the State bene-
fitted in many ways, both directly by imposts ... and indirectly from the
fact that they constituted an important element of richness and of work in
the economic life of the country." Id. at 450.
51 Oesterrichische Credit Anstalt et al c. Etat S.H.S., supra note 39,
vol. 7 at 794. Claimant's argument was that the compensation which
Yugoslavia had paid was not enough.
62 See, e.g., the case of Ferrocaril del Pacifico de Nicaragua, where the
United States Treasury exempted a Maine corporation from taxation be-
cause its capital was held by the Nicaraguan government. II Hackworth,
Digest 474 (1941). This decision was not followed in the Chinese Gov-
ernment Agency case in 1933 because of government policy, Id. at 482.
53 (Summarily rejected), Madera Co. (Ltd.), Claim No. 88, Case No.
41, Further Decisions and Opinions of the Commissioners, Claims Com-
mission Between Great Britain and Mexico 67 (1933).
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a special meaning into treaty clauses.54 Traditional theory al-
so found its followers in cases where protection of economic stabi-
lity seemed more desirable than protection against alien influ-
ence. Such a case before a United States-German mixed commis-
sion resulted in an award to a predominantly British-owned New
York corporation which employed 140 people in its office and
2,000 in its New Jersey plant.55
CONCULSION
As suggested above, no final formulation of the relevant in-
ternational standards has been attempted in this article. How-
ever, economic and social factors seem decisive in the results of
the cases examined, with traditional theory posing the greatest
difficulties. A more broad index of legal thought on this subject
can be found in agreements betveen nations which deal with
compensation claims. Though these agreements show increased
concern with individual stockholders, they have retained the con-
cept that a corporation has a nationality separate from its "con-
trol." They increasingly recognize that the nationality of a cor-
poration has a bearing only on questions which are not concerned
with the measurement of beneficial interest.5 6 As the Westhold
opinion suggests, there is now a better understanding of the limits
54Seb, e.g., Interoceanic Railway of Mexico et al, Claims No. 79 and
85, Case No. 53, id. at 18.
55 United States on behalf of Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry Co. V.
Germany ("Black Tom" case), Mixed Claims Commission between United
States and Germany, Opinions and Decisions 314 (June 15, 1989). See
also Robert Dollar v. Canadian C. & F. Co., 100 Misc. 564, 166 N.Y.Supp.
34 (Sup. Ct. 1917), aff'd, 180 App. Div. 895, 167 N.Y.Supp. 1124 (1st
Dep't 1917). The same theories were used to deny recovery where enemy
management and less important interests were involved. See Majority
Award of the Arbitral Tribunal instituted by the Reparations Commis-
sion and the Government of the United States to decide the claim of the
Standard Oil Company to certain tankers (1926), 22 A.J. Int'l L. 404
(1928). Cf. provisions for similar cases after World War ii, 19 Dep't of
State Bull. 704 (1948), 21 Dep't of State Bull. 576, 580 (1949).
56 Before World War I "all claims ... of corporations" were included
where claims were to be settled, e.g., United States-Venezuelan convention
of 1866. Some allied shareholders in German companies were protected
by the Versailles Treaty. See Nielsen, International Law Applied to Re-
clamations 61 (1933). Mexican claims conventions had various devices,
such as "allocation" of corporate claims to shareholders. See, e.g., Gen-
eral Claims Convention between United States and Mexico, Art. I, T.I.A.S.
No. 678. World War II peace treaties provided for adjudication of claims
of United Nations nationals with "ownership interests in corporations or
associations which are not United Nations nationals," e.g., Treaty of Peace
with Italy, Art. 74(b).
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of personality of a corporate entity on the international plane
than that which existed when tribunals relied largely on tradi-
tional theories.
Both national social-economic interests and international en-
terprises (as well as foreign shareholders) can expect better pro-
tection as the operating international standards come more clearly
into focus.
